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Introduction 
Many data sources show a disparity among racial and 
ethnic groups regarding participation in and contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans.  White workers participate at a 
higher rate and contribute a higher percentage than 
African American and Hispanic workers.  However, 
few studies have explored whether these differ-
ences persist once other factors expected to impact 
these decisions are taken into consideration.  One 
recent study by Ariel/Hewitt using client data found 
lower participation and contributions rates in 401(k) 
plans for African Americans and Hispanics than for 
Whites, even after controlling for age, tenure, and 
earnings.  The question is whether racial and ethnic 
differentials remain after controlling for a broader 
array of factors included in a nationally representative 
sample of households, the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF).
The brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
documents the differentials in eligibility, participa-
tion, and contribution rate by race using the SCF.  
The second section reports how the race variables 
are affected once demographic and plan variables are 
included.  The third section concludes that while addi-
tional variables can eliminate the significance of race, 
all is not necessarily right with the world.  African 
Americans and Hispanics are still less likely to have 
the kinds of jobs in which participation in a 401(k) 
plan is possible; they are less likely to have the earn-
ings, job tenure, and other factors that would cause 
them to participate in a plan; and, once in a plan, they 
are less likely to have the taste for saving that would 
result in a high contribution rate.  
Eligibility, Participation, and 
Contributions by Race
The SCF is a triennial survey of a nationally represen-
tative sample of about 4,500 U.S. households, which 
collects detailed information on households’ assets, 
liabilities, and demographic characteristics.  The 
sample consists of four groups: non-Hispanic white 
(Whites), Black/African American (Blacks), Hispanic/
Latino (Hispanics),1 and “Other” (see Figure 1 on the 
next page).  The “Other” category includes American 
Indians, Alaskan and Hawaiian natives, and Asians, 
but data from other surveys suggest that the vast 
majority of people in this category are Asian.2  Thus, 
for the purpose of this brief, we use “Asian” in place of 
“Other.”  In order to have a sufficiently large number 
of non-whites, the following analysis combines data 
from the 2001, 2004, and 2007 SCF. 
By Alicia H. Munnell and Christopher Sullivan*Similar trends occur in contributions.  For those 
workers who participate, average contributions as 
a percentage of salary vary sharply by race/ethnic-
ity.  Figure 4 shows that Black and Hispanic workers 
have lower average contribution rates than do Whites.  
Once again, Asians dominate with a contribution rate 
of almost 8 percent.    
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The first step to 401(k) saving is to work in a job 
where the employer offers a 401(k) plan.  Figure 2 
shows the percent of the non-self-employed workforce 
eligible for a 401(k) plan by race.  The percentages 
for Whites and Blacks are about 55 percent, while 
Hispanic workers are dramatically lower (37 percent) 
and Asians slightly higher (57 percent).  
Figure 1. Non-Self-Employed Workforce, by Race 
and Ethnicity, 2001, 2004, and 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer 
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Figure 2. Percent of Workforce Eligible for 
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The next step is for workers who are eligible for 
an employer’s 401(k) to participate in that plan.  At 
this stage, Whites have a higher percentage than both 
Blacks and Hispanics, but once again Asians lead all 
groups (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Average 401(k) Participation Rates of 











White Black  Hispanic Asian
Figure 4. Average Percent of Salary Contribution 
to 401(k) Plans of Workers Contributing, by Race 
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Generally, the results show that Whites do better 
at each step of the way than Blacks and Hispanics, 
and Asians do better than Whites.  So success with 
regard to 401(k) plans seems to be systematically 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2004, and 
2007 SCF. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2004, and 
2007 SCF. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2004, and 
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related to race.  The question is whether these ethnic 
discrepancies remain once socioeconomic and plan 
characteristics are taken into account.  
Adjusting for Socioeconomic 
and Plan Characteristics
Three recent studies have explored the impact of race 
on 401(k) participation and contributions, controlling 
for socioeconomic and other characteristics.  They 
come to different conclusions.   
In 2007, the Ariel/Hewitt study (2008) surveyed 
almost 3 million employees at 57 of the largest U.S. 
companies regarding race, ethnicity, gender, earnings, 
age, job tenure, and 401(k) information.  As with the 
SCF data, race appeared to play a signifi  cant role in 
determining participation and contributions.  Blacks 
and Hispanics were less likely than Whites to partici-
pate in 401(k) plans and, if they did, they were likely 
to save less.  Asians were more likely to participate 
and contribute more than Whites.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, the relevant fi  ndings were that 
controlling for earnings, job tenure, and age – the in-
formation readily available in plan data – the pattern 
remained.   
The second study (Dushi and Honig, 2008) did 
not focus on race or ethnicity but compared determi-
nants of 401(k) participation and contributions for 
51-56 year olds in the 1992 and 2004 waves of the 
Health and Retirement Study.  Race variables were 
introduced as controls.  The authors ran regressions 
separately for the two waves, then pooled the two 
waves.  They found no differential effect by race for 
participation (conditional on eligibility) or for contri-
bution amounts (conditional on contributing) in the 
pooled sample.  They found occasional signifi  cant 
effects within the cohorts.  (For example, Asians were 
21 percent more likely to participate than Whites in 
1992, and Hispanics were 17 percent less likely to 
participate than Whites in 2004). 
Schrager (2007) undertook a Blinder-Oaxaca de-
composition of models estimated from pooled cross-
section data from the 1998, 2001, and 2004 SCF.  
She found that most, if not all, of the difference in 
participation and contribution rates can be attributed 
to factors other than race.3
Given the mixed results to date, it is useful to 
see whether, in a nationally representative sample, 
race and ethnicity continue to have a statistically 
signifi  cant effect on participation and contribution 
decisions taking account of socioeconomic and plan 
characteristics.  
Figure 5 reports the marginal impact of race on 
the probability of individuals joining a 401(k) plan, as-
suming they are eligible to participate.4  With no con-
Figure 5. Effects of Selected Factors on Probability of Participating in a 401(k) Plan, 2001, 2004, 
and 2007a
a The effects of the fi  ve continuous variables, Age, Earnings, Tenure, Non-pension wealth, and DB wealth, are for a one 
standard deviation change from the mean. 
b The Asian variable in the No Controls model is signifi  cant at the 15 percent level.  All other signifi  cant variables are signifi  -
cant at least at the 10 percent level.











No Controls Ariel/Hewitt Controls Extensive Controls




















-10% 0% 10% -10% 0% 10% -10% 0% 10%trols, race plays an important role.  Compared with 
Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are about 8 percent less 
likely to participate, and the effects are statistically 
signifi  cant.  Asians are about 5 percent more likely 
to participate than Whites.  Introducing the controls 
used in the Ariel/Hewitt study – age, earnings, and 
tenure – reduces the negative effect on participation 
associated with being Black or Hispanic, but the im-
pact is still statistically signifi  cant.  The effect associ-
ated with being Asian increases somewhat.   
A more complete set of controls changes the story.  
As before, the equation includes age, earnings, and 
tenure.  Added to the equation is information on 
whether the individual graduated from college, non-
pension wealth, defi  ned benefi  t wealth (the present 
discounted value of expected benefi  ts), and whether 
the individual owns a home – a proxy for having a 
longer planning horizon.  With the complete model, 
race is no longer a determinant of plan participation.5
Figure 6 repeats the exercise for contribution 
rates.6  With no controls, Blacks and Hispanics are 
associated with signifi  cantly lower contribution rates 
– 0.5 and 1.0 percentage points, respectively – than 
Whites; Asians have a contribution rate that is 1.3 
percentage points higher.  Adding the Ariel/Hewitt 
controls does not diminish the importance of race.  
Blacks and Hispanics are associated with lower con-
tribution rates, and Asians with higher contribution 
rates than Whites, and race/ethnicity remains statisti-
cally signifi  cant.  
Again, a more complete model dampens the effect 
of race/ethnicity.  As in the participation equation, the 
original three variables – age, earnings, and tenure – 
are accompanied by information on the individual’s 
education, non-pension wealth, defi  ned benefi  t 
wealth, and home ownership.  In the case of the 
contribution decision, information is also available 
on the characteristics of the plan, such as the nature 
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Figure 6. Effects of Selected Factors on Level of Employee 401(k) Contribution Rate, 2001, 2004, 
and 2007
Note: The effects of the fi  ve continuous variables, Age, Earnings, Tenure, Non-pension wealth, and DB wealth, are for a one 
standard deviation change from the mean.
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of the employer match and the ability to borrow.  The 
combination of individual and plan characteristics 
completely eliminates the relevance of race/ethnicity 
in the case of Blacks and Hispanics.  Asians, on the 
other hand, continue to be associated with a much 
higher contribution rate – 1.2 percentage points – 
than Whites.  
Conclusion
The results from this exercise tell a goods news/
bad news story.  The good news is that 401(k) par-
ticipation and contribution decisions do not appear 
to vary by race/ethnicity.  That finding means that 
for comparably situated individuals, Blacks, Whites, 
and Hispanics respond in a similar fashion in terms 
of joining a 401(k) plan and deciding how much to 
contribute.  The bad news is that Blacks, Whites, 
and Hispanics are not similarly situated.  Blacks and 
Hispanics are less likely than Whites to be eligible 
for an employer-sponsored plan, less likely to have 
characteristics that would lead them to participate, 
and less likely to have the experience building wealth 
(as through homeownership) that would lead to high 
rates of contributions.  So, the best way to boost re-
tirement saving among minorities is not by thinking 
about race or ethnicity, but by focusing plan design 
and education efforts on those with lower levels of 
earnings and education.    
Endnotes
1  This study uses the term “Hispanic” throughout the 
text when referring to the group “Hispanic/Latino” 
from the SCF.
2  According to the Current Population Survey, Asians 
account for 4.7 percent of the non-self-employed 
workforce.   
3  Schrager considers alternatives in which minority 
characteristics are applied to the White coefficients 
and White characteristics are applied to the minority 
coefficients, obtaining somewhat different results in 
each case, as is common with such decompositions.  
4  Full regression results are shown in the Appendix.
5  This analysis ignores the possibility of race-based 
selection into jobs offering 401(k)s, which could affect 
the relative thriftiness of Black and White 401(k)-
eligible employees, controlling for observable charac-
teristics.
6  Again, this analysis does not attempt to control for 
selection bias arising from the fact that individuals 
who choose to participate are a non-random sub-
sample of those who are eligible to contribute.Center for Retirement Research 6
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Appendix Table a1. Summary Statistics for Participation and Employee Contribution Regressions, 
2001, 2004, and 2007
a Earnings are expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
b Non-pension net worth is expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars.
c DB wealth is expressed in tens of thousands of dollars. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2004, and 2007 SCF. 
Variables
DC plan participation 0.76 0.43 - -
Employee contribution - - 7.11 4.60
Black 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32
Hispanic 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24
Asian 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
Age 42.60 11.21 43.16 10.76
Earningsa 6.16 10.31 6.80 10.50
Tenure 9.53 8.81 10.36 8.92
College plus 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.50
Non-pension wealthb 3.15 15.77 3.54 16.19
DB wealthc 4.34 18.27 4.62 19.84
Homeowner 0.78 0.42 0.82 0.38
Match rate (below 0.5 percent) - - 0.21 0.41
Match rate (0.5-1.0 percent) - - 0.47 0.50
Match rate (above 1.0 percent) - - 0.13 0.34
Borrow - - 0.70 0.46
Number of observations 5,829 4,023
Participation Employee contribution
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviationAppendix Table a2. Determinants of 401(k) Participation, 2001, 2004, and 2007
Variables
Equations
Black -0.075 -0.050 -0.023
  (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Hispanic -0.081 -0.042 -0.017
  (0.028) (0.025) (0.024)
Asian 0.048 0.055 0.041
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
Age - 0.000 -0.001
  (0.001) (0.001)
Earningsa - 0.011 0.009
    (0.003) (0.002)
Tenure - 0.008 0.008
    (0.001) (0.001)
College plus - - 0.072
      (0.014)
Non-pension wealthb - - -0.001
    (0.000)
DB wealthc - - -0.002
      (0.000)
Homeowner - - 0.128
      (0.017)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.057 0.079
Number of observations 5,829 5,829 5,829
No Controls Ariel/Hewitt Controls Extensive Controls
a Earnings are expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
b Non-pension net worth is expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars.
c DB wealth is expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Model includes year fixed effects.  The coefficients report marginal 
effects from probits estimated using SCF analysis weights, computed at sample means of righthand side variables; Huber-
White standard errors; and significance at 90 percent (*), 95 percent (**), and 99 percent (***) levels.  The dependent vari-
able is a dummy taking the value one if the individual participates in a defined contribution plan, zero otherwise.














Issue in Brief 9Appendix Table a3. Determinants of Employee 401(k) Contribution Rates, 2001, 2004, and 2007
Variables
Equations
Black -0.510 -0.452 0.175
  (0.239) (0.239) (0.213)
Hispanic -0.954 -0.790 -0.243
  (0.293) (0.291) (0.263)
Asian 1.350 1.545 1.158
  (0.530) (0.521) (0.428)
Age - 0.048 0.032
  (0.010) (0.009)
Earningsa - -0.027 -0.048
    (0.004) (0.007)
Tenure - 0.036 0.027
    (0.011) (0.011)
College plus - - 0.634
      (0.147)
Non-pension wealthb - - 0.004
    (0.003)
DB wealthc - - 0.009
      (0.006)
Homeowner - - 0.751
      (0.176)
Match rate (below 0.5 percent) - - 2.355
      (0.273)
Match rate (0.5-1.0 percent) - - -1.611
      (0.213)
Match rate (above 1.0 percent) - - -3.290
      (0.227)
Borrow - - 1.064
      (0.143)
Constant 7.118 4.960 4.667
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.037 0.219
Number of observations 4,023 4,023 4,023




















a Earnings are expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
b Non-pension net worth is expressed in hundreds of thousands of dollars.
c DB wealth is expressed in tens of thousands of dollars.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  * Denotes significance at 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and 
*** at the 1 percent level.  Model includes year fixed effects.  This table reports the coefficients and standard deviations from 
an OLS model in which the dependent variable is the employee’s 401(k) contribution as a percent of their earnings, condi-
tional on participating in a plan.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001, 2004, and 2007 SCF. 
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